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1 Introduction
With declining and aging populations around the world, the participation of women in the
labor force has come to the forefront of policymakers’ attention (Clements, Dybczak, and
Soto, 2016). This has also brought to light the existence of a gender wage gap, which
narrowed considerably over the last few decades but continues to prevail in labor markets.
This paper explores the impact of a major trade shock – the enactment of NAFTA – on the
gender wage gap in the U.S. in the 1990s.
NAFTA, the most important trade policy change in the U.S. over the past three decades,
was enacted on January 1, 1994 and featured a 10-year schedule of tariff phase-out between
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) examine the effect of U.S.
tariff reductions against imports from Mexico as a result of NAFTA on U.S. workers’ wage
growth in the 1990s. The findings suggest very heterogeneous effects across U.S. workers
of different educational classes that also vary across locations and industries. In particular,
NAFTA is associated with slower wage growth for less skilled workers employed in more
vulnerable industries and residing in more vulnerable locations. That paper, however, did
not address NAFTA’s potential impact on the gender wage gap.
Much of the existing literature focuses on gender wage gap in developing countries (see
Aguayo-Tellez [2012] and Papyrakis, Covarrubias, and Verschoor [2012] for an extensive sur-
vey). While there is an agreement about the existence of a sizable gender wage gap in
advanced economies, the literature offers no consensus about the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on the gender wage gap and labor force participation and employment rates. Black and
Brainerd (2004) study the effects of increased import competition on the gender wage gap
across industries and metropolitan areas in the U.S. using the Current Population Survey
(CPS) from 1977 to 1994 and the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. They find that after controlling
for individual characteristics the residual gender wage gap narrowed more rapidly in con-
centrated industries that experienced a trade shock than in competitive industries, lending
support to Becker’s (1957) model of discrimination according to which increased market
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competition reduces employer discrimination in the long run.
Using U.S. data from 1990-1991 and 2006-2007, Sauré and Zoabi (2014) examine the
effects of a higher exposure to trade with Mexico on female employment shares and female
relative wages across U.S. states, and find that trade expansion had a negative impact on
female employment relative to male employment in states with greater exports to Mexico.
The results remain robust for married female workers; for female workers of all educational
categories (less than high school, high school graduate and advanced education); and for
workers in manufacturing only. They do not find a significant difference in female relative
wages due to higher trade exposure, attributing it to a selection bias whereby the measured
average wages of working women do not change, while the unmeasured potential wages of
nonworking women decrease (as they leave labor force). Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) ex-
amine the impact of rising Chinese import competition on U.S. labor market outcomes over
the period of 1990-2007 and find that both male and female employment and the correspond-
ing wages decreased but that these changes were more pronounced for women. Brussevich
(2016) shows that some portion of declining gender wage gap in the U.S. can be explained by
differential labor adjustment costs. She estimates a structural econometric model of dynamic
labor adjustment and finds that, although men tend to have overall lower adjustment costs
than women, women have an advantage in moving into service-sector jobs following a shock
to traded-sector labor demand. None of these papers, however, addresses the differences
in income distribution by gender, marital status, education, industry of employment, and
location simultaneously, which is the focus of this paper.
Studies of trade and the gender wage gap in developing countries are more common
and tend to conclude that trade liberalization improved labor market outcomes of women.
Aguayo-Tellez, Airola, and Juhn (2010) document increased female employment rates and
female relative wages in Mexico during the 1990s as a result of NAFTA. Using establishment-
level data for the Mexican manufacturing sector, they show that the female wage bill share
increased in response to reductions in U.S. tariffs on Mexican goods, particularly for skilled
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blue-collar female workers. Using the same data from Mexico, Juhn, Ujhelyi, and Villegas-
Sanchez (2014) show that tariff reductions due to NAFTA increased the ratio of female
blue-collar workers to male blue-collar workers as well as the relative wage of female blue-
collar workers, with little evidence for white-collar women’s share and relative wages. Gaddis
and Pieters (2014) find that trade liberalization in Brazil reduced male and female labor force
participation and employment rates, but the effects on men were significantly larger, leading
to gender convergence in labor force participation and employment rates.
This paper borrows from several advances in the literature and builds on the method-
ological framework developed in Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) to study the differential
impact of tariff reductions on men’s and women’s wage growth and labor force participation
decisions over the 1990s by exploiting the exogenous nature of the NAFTA shock. We use
publicly available U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000, taken from the IPUMS project at
the Minnesota Population Center (www.ipums.org; see Ruggles et al. [2015]). The richness
of our data allows us to estimate the differential impact of a trade shock within a location,
industry, occupation, and educational class.
To anticipate results, we find that reductions in blue-collar wage growth from NAFTA
tariff reductions were much larger for women than men, and much larger for married women
than single women. We investigate four possible explanations for this finding: differential
sensitivity to shocks across occupations; household bargaining within a marriage; non-linear
preferences interacted with household bargaining; and selective non-participation in the labor
market on the part of married women. We are able to reject the first three with the data;
the fourth appears to be plausibly a portion of the explanation, but it is unable to explain
the full effect. We therefore conclude with a puzzle.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the methodological
framework developed in Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) and presents the basic results for
the wage growth over the 1990s for six groups of workers: married men and women with
an employed spouse, married men and women with a spouse who is unemployed or not in
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the labor force (NILF) and single men and women. Section 2 concludes by laying out three
stylized facts. Section 3 proposes four possible explanations for our basic findings in Section
2 and develops a simple theoretical model for each explanation followed by further empirical
tests of the proposed theory. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Approach and Basic Results
Our analysis of local labor markets requires a time-invariant definition of local labor mar-
kets in the U.S. We take advantage of consistently defined Public Use Microdata Areas
(conspumas) constructed by and available from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles et al., 2015). There
are 543 conspumas covering both urban and rural areas in the U.S. Following the empirical
specification in Hakobyan and McLaren (2016), we construct a measure of a conspuma’s ex-
posure to NAFTA as the 1990 employment share weighted U.S. tariff rate (against Mexican
imports) in 1990, adjusted for Mexico’s relative comparative advantage (RCA). We refer to
this measure as average local tariff or local vulnerability.
locτ c1990 ≡
∑Nind
j=1 L
cj
1990RCA
jτ j1990∑Nind
j=1 L
cj
1990RCA
j
, (2.1)
where Lcjt is the number of workers employed in industry j at conspuma c at date t, Nind
is the number of industries, and
RCAj =
(
xMEXj,1990
xROWj,1990
)
(∑
i
xMEXi,1990∑
i
xROWi,1990
)
The variation in this measure comes from three sources: (1) differential concentration of
employment across industries in each conspuma, (2) specialization in industries in which
Mexico has comparative (dis)advantage relative to the rest of the world, and (3) the U.S.
imposed differential tariff rates. Analogously, we define industry tariff rates, adjusted for
Mexico’s relative comparative advantage.
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The use of the Census data collected in 1990 and 2000 dictates our empirical approach
to identifying the effect of NAFTA, which went into effect in 1994. The agreement was
framed as a gradual phase-out of tariffs between the three countries, starting in 1994 and
continuing for 10 years (with a few tariffs continuing to 15 years). We focus on exposure
to Mexican imports at the time of NAFTA’s enactment because the reduction of tariffs
between the U.S. and Canada began much earlier with the signing of a free trade agreement
between the two countries in 1989. The negotiated schedule of liberalization was different
for each sector of the economy. As a result, for some industries, the period from 1990 to 2000
was the period of an announcement of tariff reductions, most of which occurred after 2000.
For other industries, the same period saw rapid elimination of tariffs. As a result, we deal
with variation in the timing of liberalization by controlling separately for both the initial
tariff rates in 1990, which capture the potential vulnerability of a location or an industry to
imports from Mexico, and the actual change in tariffs between 1990 and 2000.
In addition to the differential responses of men and women to a trade shock, we ac-
knowledge that married and single individuals are likely to respond differentially as well.
A married worker may be more constrained in responding to a trade shock because some
forms of response, such as relocation, require agreement from all members of the household.
Furthermore, the response of a married couple with both husband and wife being employed
may well differ from those couples that have an unemployed spouse or a spouse not in labor
force.
These considerations prompt us to consider the labor market outcomes of exposure to
import competition from Mexico for six groups of workers separately: married men or women
with an employed spouse, married men or women with a spouse who is unemployed or not in
labor force, single men, and single women. We focus initially on wage growth between 1990
and 2000. Our rich empirical specification allows for dynamic response of wages for each
group of workers to vary by industry, location, and education level (high school dropout,
high school graduate, some college or associate’s degree, and college graduate). We also
6
allow for a different rate of wage growth for locations on the U.S.-Mexico border.
log(wi) = αXi +
∑
j
αindj indi,j +
∑
c
αconspumac conspumai,c +
∑
n
αoccn occi,n (2.2)
+
∑
k 6=col
γ1keducik +
∑
k
γ2keducikyr2000i
+
∑
k 6=col
δ1keduciklocτ
c(i)
1990 +
∑
k
δ2keducikyr2000ilocτ c(i)1990
+
∑
k 6=col
δ3keducikloc4τ c(i) +
∑
k
δ4keducikyr2000iloc4τ c(i)
+
∑
k 6=col
θ1keducikRCA
jτ
j(i)
1990 +
∑
k
θ2keducikyr2000iRCAjτ j(i)1990
+
∑
k 6=col
θ3keducikRCA
j4τ j(i) +∑
k
θ4keducikyr2000iRCAj4τ j(i)
+ µBorderc(i)yr2000i + i,
where conspumai,c, indi,j and occi,n are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if worker i
resides in conspuma c, works in industry j, and has an occupation n, respectively; c(i) is the
index of worker i’s conspuma, and 4τ j(i) and loc4τ c(i) are the changes in tariff for industry
j and location c, as defined at the beginning of this section.
The parameters of primary interest here are δ2,k and δ4,k, which measure the initial-tariff
effect and the impact effect, respectively, for the local average tariff; and θ2,k and θ4,k, which
measure the initial-tariff effect and the impact effect, respectively, for the industry tariff. If
it is easy for workers to move geographically, so that local wage premiums are arbitraged
away, but difficult for workers to switch industry, we will observe δ1,k, . . . , δ4,k = 0 while
θ1,k, . . . , θ4,k 6= 0. In that case, industry matters but location does not. On the other hand,
if it is difficult for workers to move geographically but easy to switch industries within one
location, we will see the opposite: δ1,k, . . . , δ4,k 6= 0 while θ1,k, . . . , θ4,k = 0. In reporting our
results, we focus on the case when a location or an industry loses all of its protection within
the sample period, thus the effect on wages within the sample period is equal to δ2,k − δ4,k
in a given location and θ2,k − θ4,k in a given industry.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Gender, Marital Status and Employment Status of the
Spouse
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single Total
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Age 42.42 40.71 43.48 47.59 37.80 40.40 41.21
White 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.82
English speaking 0.996 0.995 0.989 0.985 0.986 0.992 0.992
Home owner 0.82 0.83 0.76 0.79 0.55 0.55 0.72
Child(ren) 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.34 0.19 0.34 0.41
High school dropouts 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.11
High school graduates 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.33
Some college 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.30
College graduates 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.27
Log wage income 10.33 9.55 10.34 9.43 9.92 9.69 9.91
No of observations 2,484,061 2,642,608 1,225,432 410,167 1,656,555 1,809,235 10,228,339
In the regressions below, we use a 5 percnet sample from the U.S. Census for 1990 and
2000, available from IPUMS-USA, selecting workers aged 25-64 who report a positive pre-
tax wage and salary income in the previous year.1 In addition to constructed interaction
terms and conspuma, industry, and occupation fixed effects, we include the following personal
characteristics: age, English-speaking, race, home ownership, presence of a school-aged child,
and educational attainment.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the personal characteristics for the six groups
of workers based on gender, marital status, and employment status of the spouse. In our
sample, single workers (both male and female) are on average younger (38 and 40 years old),
more racially diverse (76 and 73 percent white), less likely to own a home (55 percent), and
less likely to have a child (19 percent of men and 34 percent of women). Although high
school dropouts are 11 percent of the total, this fraction is considerably higher among men
1The sample includes individuals who report being employed, unemployed, or not in labor force in the
census year. We use the last industry of employment for the unemployed and those not in labor force.
Wage/income regressions omit those workers with no reported wage/income. Labor force participation
regressions include all workers in the sample.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Industry and Local Average Tariffs
Variable (%) Mean St. Dev. Min Max N
Industry tariff in 1990 1.0 2.0 0 8.8 89
Change in industry tariff -0.9 1.6 -7.0 0.01 89
Local tariff in 1990 1.03 0.67 0.09 4.74 543
Change in local tariff -0.92 0.61 -4.30 -0.08 543
NOTE: Industry level tariff variables are computed from 8-digit HS level tariff data weighted
by imports from Mexico and are mapped into 89 tradable goods industries based on Census
industry classification. Conspuma level tariff variables are weighted by employment in
industries of a given conspuma.
and women with unemployed/NILF spouse and considerably lower among both men and
women with employed spouse. The remainder of the sample is about evenly split between
high school graduates, those with some college, and college graduates for married workers
with employed spouse, while for other groups the fraction of college graduates is smaller
than that of high school graduates and those with some college.
Table 2 summarizes our measures of industry and location vulnerability.2 The 1990
RCA-adjusted industry tariff across 89 traded-goods industries ranges from 0 to 9 percent,
with a mean of 1 percent. The initial local average tariff across 543 conspumas ranges from
approximately 0.09 to 4.74 percent, with a mean just above 1 percent. It is worth pointing
out that when computing the local average tariff we omit agriculture by setting its tariff
equal to zero because a coarse aggregation of industries in Census data applies the same
tariff to all agricultural crops.3
Table 3 shows the difference between the initial-tariff effect and the change-in-tariff effect
for the main specification in Equation (2.2) with all right-hand-side variables and industry,
conspuma and occupation fixed effects, run separately for each of our six groups of workers.
Standard errors are clustered by conspuma, industry, and year, following Cameron, Gelbach,
2Data on U.S. tariffs on imports from Mexico come from John Romalis and are described in Feenstra,
Romalis, and Schott (2002). US imports data are obtained from the U.S. International Trade Commission.
3For further discussion, see Hakobyan and McLaren (2016).
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and Miller (2006). The coefficients on personal characteristics have the expected signs across
all groups of workers and are not reported here. There is a concave age curve; white English
speaking workers enjoy a wage premium (except for white married women with employed
spouse); workers who own a home earn higher wages; and workers with more education earn
higher wages, ceteris paribus. Male workers with a child at home earn higher wages, whereas
female workers with a child earn lower wages, ceteris paribus.
First examining the location variables, Table 3 shows that among conspumas that lost
their protection quickly under NAFTA, those that appeared to be very vulnerable had sub-
stantially lower wage growth for married female high school dropout workers than those with
low initial tariffs. In particular, married female workers with less than high school educa-
tion and an employed spouse, living in the most vulnerable conspuma with an initial local
average tariff of 4.74 percent, would see a substantial drop in wage growth over the 1990s of
around 18 percentage points (4.74 × (−3.08) = −18). However, we do not find a similarly
strong effect for married male workers with less than high school education, nor for workers
with higher level of educational attainment. Furthermore, among single workers of all edu-
cational attainment, the effect on wage growth is smaller and statistically insignificant, with
no significant difference between male and female workers.
Turning now to the industry effects, Table 3 shows a similarly asymmetric response of
wages of married female workers with less than high school education, with the effect for
married male workers being of smaller magnitude and imprecisely estimated. In particular,
married female high school dropout workers with an employed spouse, working in the most
highly protected industry with an initial tariff of 8.8 percent, would see wage growth of 33.4
percentage points lower (8.8× (−3.797) = −33.4) if it lost its protection right away than
similar workers in an industry that had no protection. Unlike the location effects, the effect
of industry tariffs is statistically significant for high school dropout single workers. Again, the
effect is much smaller for high school graduates and those with some college, and negligible
(and at times positive) for college graduates.
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Table 3: Wage Growth: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.35 -3.8*** -1.99 -2.71* -1.173 -1.86
High school graduate -0.275 -0.358 -1.728*** -1.99** -0.496 -0.87
Some college -1.216* -1.357* -1.115* -1.262 -0.876* -0.727
College graduate -0.219 -1.944* -0.848 -2.423 0.299 -0.133
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.847 -3.797** -0.822 -3.897** -1.674*** -1.874*
High school graduate -0.41* -2.913*** 0.635* -2.704*** -0.579 -0.452
Some college 0.021 -1.491 -0.216 -1.597 0.12 0.536
College graduate -0.083 2.041 0.531 0.585 -0.9674 0.665
No of observations 2,484,061 2,642,608 1,225,713 410,174 1,656,555 1,809,235
To sum up the results so far, we find that: there is no real difference between the wage
response of unmarried men and women; there is a much more negative effect on married
women’s wages than married men’s wages, particularly for blue-collar workers (in fact, most
of the effect of NAFTA on blue-collar wages seems to be driven by married women); and
these effects hold true whether the worker’s spouse is working or not.
To be sure that our results are not driven by the way we measure our dependent variable,
or how we select the sample of workers, we estimate the same regression replacing the
dependent variable with self-employment income for those with no wage income; replacing
the dependent variable with weekly wage; excluding workers over 55 years old; and excluding
workers with spouses younger than 25 and older than 64. The results reported in Appendix
Tables A.1-A.4 continue to be in line with the earlier findings in Table 3. We conclude
that our basic results are not driven by measurement error in dependent variable or sample
selection.
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3 Search for Explanations
Below we investigate four different possible explanations for the results presented in the
previous section.
(1) Heterogeneous occupations. It could be that different occupations have different levels
of sensitivity to industry-level trade shocks, for example, because the cost of interindustry
mobility differs across occupations. If women are overrepresented in the more sensitive
occupations, that can lead to a larger wage effect on average for women than for men.
(2) Household bargaining. It could be that married women are less mobile than other
workers because switching industries sometimes requires switching city of residence, which
is a joint decision with her spouse. We investigate the possibility that if a husband has more
bargaining power than a wife, this can result in asymmetries in moving frictions that result
in larger wage impacts for married women than for single workers or married men. We will
show that simply assuming more bargaining power for husbands is inadequate to explain the
phenomena in the data, because asymmetric bargaining power within the household on its
own does not lead to asymmetries in worker mobility.
(3)Household bargaining with non-linear preferences. We add to the household-bargaining
model to allow for non-linear interactions between consumption and locational preference,
so that the marginal utility of consumption is affected by the city in which the household
resides. We show that this can lead to effects of asymmetric bargaining power on worker
mobility, but it still is not sufficient to explain the correlations in the data.
(4) Selective non-participation. It is possible that when an industry shrinks due to a
trade shock that a certain fraction of workers choose to leave the labor force. If those leavers
are disproportionately married women, and disproportionately the higher-paid workers in
their industry, the selection effect can result in a larger drop for the average wage for the
remaining married female workers in the industry compared to other groups. We present an
equilibrium model in which exactly this prediction emerges.
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3.1 Heterogeneous Occupations
3.1.1 Theory
Occupations vary greatly in the gender composition of their workers, with some occupations
dominated by women and others by men. As one example, ‘textile sewing machine operators,’
an occupation with more than a million workers in our dataset, has 10 female workers for
every 1 male worker. If occupations also differ in the portability of skills across industries,
with some occupations very mobile and others immobile, then it could be that female-
dominated occupations happen to be, on average, less mobile across industries. This would
imply a larger wage response to a trade shock for women on average, even if all genders are
treated equally.
A simple example can illustrate the point. Suppose that there are two industries indexed
i = 1, 2 and two occupations indexed j = 1, 2. Production in each industry requires labor
input from both occupations, so output of industry i is given by a concave linear homogeneous
production function f i(Li1, Li2), where Lij is the number of workers in occupation j employed
by industry i. Suppose that each worker is attached to an occupation and cannot change it.
To capture the idea that different occupations can have different degrees of mobility in a
simple way, suppose that workers in occupation 2 cannot change their industry of employ-
ment, but workers in occupation 1 can change their industry freely. Perhaps occupation 2
requires mastering a particular part of a production process with particular machines that
differ from one industry to another and so the skills required for it are not portable across
industries (sewing machines, for example, are not useful outside of the apparel industry);
while occupation 1 requires general production-floor activities that are similar across indus-
tries. Suppose that the price of output from both industries is given on world markets (for
simplicity, assume that the economy in question is a small open economy), but the domestic
price can differ from the world price due to trade policy. Letting good 2 be the numeraire,
suppose that industry 1 is import-competing, and its domestic price, p, is equal to the world
13
price plus an import tariff. All agents take all prices as given.4
Since occupation 1 is mobile, the wage w1 paid to it must be the same in both industries.
Since this will be equal to the marginal value product of labor, we have:
pf 11 (L11, L12) = w1 = f 21 (L21, L22) = f 21 (L1 − L11, L22), (3.1)
where subscripts on a function indicate partial derivatives and L1 is the exogenous and fixed
supply of workers in occupation 1. This determines the allocation of occupation-1 workers
across the two industries, and also w1. Further, the occupation-2 wages in the two industries
must adjust to yield zero profits in both industries:
c1(w1, w12) = p, and (3.2)
c2(w1, w22) = 1, (3.3)
where ci(·) denotes the unit cost function for industry i and wi2 is the occupation-2 wage in
industry i.
Differentiating (3.1) with respect to p, allowing L11 to adjust, shows that
dL11
dp
> 0, so a
reduction in the tariff on industry 1 will move labor from industry 1 to 2. This will reduce w1
(from the industry 2 first-order condition) and increase w1
p
(from the industry-2 first-order
condition). If we write the elasticity of a variable X with respect to Y as XY , then this
implies:
0 < w1p < 1. (3.4)
Differentiating the two zero-profit conditions then implies that a drop in the tariff will require
a more-than-proportional drop in w12 to restore industry-1 zero profits, and an increase in
4This simple structure gives the model the same form as the Ricardo-Viner model of trade (Jones, 1971).
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w22 to restore industry-2 zero profits:
w22p < 0 < 1 < w12p. (3.5)
Conditions (3.4) and (3.5) together imply that the wage response for the immobile occu-
pation in the import-competing industry will be much larger than for the mobile occupation.
If it so happens that women are concentrated in occupation 2 and men in occupation 1, then
a larger wage effect will be measured for female workers whose industry tariff is reduced
than for men. This is true even with industry and occupation fixed effects, because the fixed
effects will control for differences in the level of wage, not differences in the elasticity of wage
with respect to the tariff change. We can now ask whether or not this story is consistent
with the evidence.
3.1.2 Empirical Test
To test whether the findings are driven by differential response of female-dominated occu-
pations, we construct a dummy for female-dominated occupations and interact it with the
industry and local tariff variables. To identify female-dominated occupations, we compute
the ratio of women to men in each occupation in 1990. The ratio ranges from 0.01 (Bus, truck,
and stationary engine mechanics - a highly male-dominated occupation) to 101 (Secretaries
- a highly female-dominated occupation). Our dummy for female-dominated occupations
takes the value of 1 if this ratio is greater than five; in other words, the number of women in
a given occupation is five times that of men in 1990, and zero otherwise.5 Table 4 lists all
such female-dominated occupations.
We add the dummy for female-dominated occupations to our main specification in Equa-
tion (2.2) by interacting it with our industry and local tariff measures and year-2000 dummy.
The summary results are reported in Table 5 analogous to Table 3. It is clear that the results
5The ranking of occupations by female-to-male ratio barely changes when we use our entire sample or
only 2000 Census.
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Table 4: Top female-dominated occupations in 1990
Occupation Ratio Number of women
Secretaries 101.4 3,851,569
Dental hygienists 62.0 72,233
Kindergarten and earlier school teachers 60.0 256,903
Dental assistants 42.3 156,596
Receptionists 36.8 647,715
Child care workers 31.6 708,023
Home economics instructors 22.6 429
Typists 21.7 576,082
Private household cleaners and servants 20.3 342,895
Teacher’s aides 20.2 527,236
Registered nurses 18.0 1,841,392
Dressmakers and seamstresses 17.6 99,349
Licensed practical nurses 16.1 418,852
Bank tellers 16.1 372,053
Health record tech specialists 14.8 48,605
Speech therapists 12.9 63,613
Dietitians and nutritionists 10.9 84,485
Bookkeepers and accounting and auditing clerks 10.8 1,706,530
Billing clerks and related financial records processing 10.0 181,137
Textile sewing machine operators 9.9 748,830
Stenographers 9.6 71,826
Eligibility clerks for government programs; social welfare 9.4 44,392
Data entry keyers 8.7 488,791
Hairdressers and cosmetologists 8.7 600,769
Payroll and timekeeping clerks 8.6 158,888
Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants 8.4 1,634,812
Occupational therapists 7.9 33,858
Telephone operators 7.8 193,031
Sales demonstrators / promoters / models 7.7 42,690
Library assistants 7.1 84,999
Crossing guards and bridge tenders 6.7 33,675
Human resources clerks, except payroll and timekeeping 6.5 66,110
Kitchen workers 6.2 132,809
Welfare service aides 6.1 41,980
General office clerks 6.0 1,107,735
File clerks 5.9 157,802
Waiter/waitress 5.9 880,093
Housekeepers, maids, butlers, stewards, and lodging quarters cleaners 5.7 657,273
Cashiers 5.6 1,518,375
Special education teachers 5.1 50,671
Librarians 5.0 154,557
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Table 5: Wage Growth: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects (Controlling for
Female-dominated Occupations)
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.35 -3.33*** -1.95 -2.69* -1.249 -2.00
High school graduate -0.272 0.103 -1.706*** -2.03* -0.586 -1.034
Some college -1.219* -0.84 -1.093 -1.33 -1.017* -0.953
College graduate -0.23 -1.716 -0.832 -2.463 0.186 -0.238
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.843** -3.163** -0.71 -3.358** -1.673** -1.223
High school graduate -0.394 -2.217** 0.698* -2.071* -0.562 0.287
Some college 0.038 -0.683 -0.167 -0.933 0.17 1.331**
College graduate -0.079 2.371* 0.561 0.935 -0.929 1.064
No of observations 2,484,061 2,642,608 1,225,713 410,167 1,656,555 1,809,235
are not affected in any substantive way after controlling for female-dominated occupations.
We conclude that the differential effects of NAFTA by gender are not caused by the different
occupational mixes shown by male and female workers.
3.2 Household Bargaining
3.2.1 Theory
We now consider the possibility that household bargaining, with asymmetric bargaining
power within the household, may be driving the results.
For illustration of the main points in the simplest way possible, consider a model with
two periods, two industries, and two towns. Suppose that industry 2 is the numeraire and
produces an export good, and industry 1 produces an import-competing good, whose world
price is Pw, which is taken as given, while the domestic price is P = Pw + t, where t is
an import tariff. All economic agents have the same homothetic utility function, which
produces a consumer price index φ(P ). Denote the real price of good 1 by p1 ≡ Pφ(P ) , which
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is increasing in the tariff, and the real price of good 2 by p2 ≡ 1φ(P ) , which is decreasing in
the tariff. Each worker can produce either good i = 1, 2 in either town j = 1, 2; no other
factor than labor is required.6
Each worker z has an inherent ability az,i,j in industry i in town j. The worker’s ability
in a given industry is allowed to differ from one town to the next, which could occur because
the worker has social networks or previous business associates in particular locations that
allow him/her to find a more productive business arrangement than in other locations, even
within the same industry (there is strong evidence for the importance of local social networks
in finding employment; see Topa [2001]). We could think of the az,i,j as representing worker
z’s local “opportunities” in industry i in town j. Worker z’s real wage is then wz,i,j = piaz,i,j
if he or she works in industry i in town j.
In addition to the wage, each worker z expects a utility benefit z,j from being in city
j. This could be due to idiosyncratic tastes for climate, amenities, friends, or enemies who
happen to live in each town. Both a worker’s ability in each industry and town, and that
worker’s preference for each town are fixed for that worker’s lifetime, and the distribution of
these two traits across workers is independent. Suppose that the utility the worker receives
is a function v of consumption cz and amenity preferences z,j. For now, we assume a linear
relationship: v(cz, z,j) = cz + z,j.
Now, suppose that during period 1 it is announced that the tariff t will be reduced,
lowering real price of output in industry 1, and hence lowering the real wage for every
worker employed in that industry. Workers in each industry have the option of switching
to the other industry and/or town at the end of period 1. If a worker switches, he/she will
receive the period-2 wage and idiosyncratic town utility benefit in the new industry/town
6This structure is of the type known as an ‘assignment model’ (Costinot and Vogel, 2015). It would be
much more realistic to assume that each industry produces with labor and at least one other factor, for
example, a specific factor that is in fixed and exogenous supply in each town. Specifically, each industry i
in each town j ∈ {1, 2} could have an endowment of a specific factor denoted Ki,j . This would allow for the
two towns to have different employment patterns. Those features create complications that are not germane
to the point being made here, however, so we omit them.
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combination.7
Assume that the workers are composed in equal numbers of male and female, and that
some fraction are paired up in heterosexual marriages. The distribution of abilities and town
preferences is the same for each gender and also for married and single workers. We first
discuss the behavior of single workers, then married ones.
Single workers. A worker with no family attachments will simply choose the industry
and city combination (i, j) in each period to maximize v(wz,i,j, z,j), since for such a worker
consumption cz will be equal to the real wage.
When the tariff is reduced, some workers will leave industry 1. The workers who switch
industries will be those who, relative to the pool of incumbent industry-1 workers, ceteris
paribus, have a relatively low comparative advantage in industry 1 (az,1,j−az,2,j) and a taste
for a town in which their industry-2 opportunities are good (high z,j for a j with az,2,j big
relative to az,1,j). Some workers will change towns in order to switch industries; for example,
an industry-1 worker in town 1 might have az,2,2 much bigger than az,2,1, and if z,2 is not too
much lower than z,1, it will then be optimal to move to town 2 in order to switch industries.
We can characterize the adjustment as follows.
Proposition 1. The drop in the tariff causes a net movement of single workers out of
industry 1. In addition, the average productivity az,i,j of workers in industry 1 will rise.
As a result of the movements of workers out of industry 1, the drop in wages to industry-1
workers caused by the tariff reduction will be mitigated by a selection effect: The workers
who leave the industry are on average those who are less productive in industry 1 than the
average worker in the industry. This selection effect means that the average wage for single
workers in industry 1 will fall by less than the output price p1.8
7The idiosyncratic abilities and town benefits will imply that only a fraction of workers will switch
industries or move following the trade shock. In this way, they act like switching costs or moving costs. A
full model would need to include direct costs of moving and switching industries, such as retraining and the
like. We omit those here for simplicity of exposition.
8If we had a richer model with a fixed factor in each industry, there would be a second mitigating effect:
The reduction in the labor supply to industry 1 would push up the marginal physical product of labor in that
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Married workers. For simplicity, we assume that both partners in a marriage must live
and work in the same town; that all workers are employed in equilibrium, regardless of
gender or marital status; and that marriages do not either form or break up. Within each
marriage, intra-household allocation issues are dealt with by bargaining, as for example in
Browning et al. (1994). Suppose that at the beginning of period 1, each couple finds itself
exogenously located in one of the two towns,9 and must bargain to choose the town in
which to live and work in period 1, and again bargain at the beginning of period 2 after
the policy has been revealed.10 The threat point takes the form of continuing to live in
the initial town and each partner in the marriage consuming his/her real wage. Within a
marriage where in period 1 the husband worked in industry ih and the wife in iw, while both
lived in town j, the period-2 industry of employment of each spouse, i′h for the husband
and i′w for the wife; the consumption, c′h and c′w, and the city of residence, j′ (which we
recall is the same for both partners in the marriage), are chosen to maximize the generalized
Nash maximand:
(
v(c′h, h,j
′)− v(wh,ih,j, h,j)
)µ (
v(c′w, w,j
′)− v(ww,iw,j, w,j)
)1−µ
, subject to
the constraint that c′h + c′w = wh,i
′
h,j
′ + ww,i′w,j′ . Here, µ is the husband’s bargaining power.
In an egalitarian marriage, µ = 12 .
Now, recalling that we are focused for the moment on the special case in which v(c, ) =
c + , the case of linear preferences, maximizing the Nash maximand can be broken into
two pieces: choosing a common value for the town, j, together with an industry for each
spouse, and then choosing an allocation of consumption between the two subject to the
budget constraint created by that choice. The second choice amounts to choosing a pair of
values for the utility of the two spouses, (c′h + h,j
′
, c′w + w,j
′), which is a point on a straight
line from the endpoint (h,j′ , wh,i′h,j′ + ww,i′w,j′ + w,j′), which gives all of the consumption to
the husband, to the endpoint (wh,i′h,j′ + ww,i′w,j′ + h,j′ , w,j′), which gives it all to the wife.
industry, increasing the price of effective labor there, and so increasing the wage received by any industry-1
worker conditional on ability.
9In a fuller model of dynamic adjustment, such as in Artuç and McLaren (2015), this initial allocation
would be determined endogenously as the pre-shock steady state.
10We assume that the change in tariff at the start of period 2 is a surprise, so it does not factor into
period-1 bargaining.
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Any increase in wh,i′h,j′ +ww,i′w,j′ + h,j′ + w,j′ will shift this line upward, allowing for higher
values for the two spouses’ utilities. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 2. In each period, bargaining within a marriage results in a common value of
j′ and an industry pair i′h and i′w that maximizes:
wh,i
′
h,j
′ + ww,i′w,j′ + h,j′ + w,j′ . (3.6)
It is worth pointing out that we can see here why it matters that the idiosyncratic
abilities az,i,j in general vary by town and not only by industry. In the special case in which
a worker’s productivity in a given industry does not depend on the town in which he is
employed, so that az,i,j ≡ az,i, maximization of Equation (3.6) is separable in the town and
industry decisions. The couple can choose the town that maximizes the sum of their z,j′
preference terms, and within that town choose the industries that maximize their incomes.
Since this choice of industry is no different from what a single worker would do, we conclude
that there would be no difference in the response of industry employment shares or in the
behavior of average productivities in either industry, or therefore, in wages, as a result of
the trade shock, between married and single workers, or between workers of either gender.
Our data reject that possibility, so we proceed with the assumption that workers’ abilities
across industries are not perfectly correlated across towns.
A full analysis of the equilibrium response to a reduction in the tariff is beyond our
scope, but it is easy to see how marriage can make a worker less responsive to trade shocks
that affect her industry. Consider a single worker who is initially in industry-town cell (1, 1)
and who following the tariff reduction would switch to (2, 2). If that same worker had been
married to a worker with a strong enough preference for town 1, the couple would remain
in that location and the worker in question would choose between industry 1 and 2 in that
town. If her ability in industry 2 in town 1 happens to be weak, it will be optimal to
remain in (1, 1). Put differently, a single worker will choose industry and town to maximize
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wz,i
′,j′ +z,j′ but a married couple will maximize w¯i′,j′ +¯j′ , where w¯i′,j′ ≡ 12
[
wh,i
′
h,j
′ + ww,i′w,j′
]
and ¯ij′ ≡ 12
[
h,j
′ + w,j′
]
. A change in a worker’s wage matters half as much at the margin
for the decision in a marriage compared to the decision for a single worker.
Consider the implications for equilibrium wages, as determined by the labor supply effect
and the selection effect discussed above. If it is true that fewer married women leave industry
1 following the trade shock than single women do, the selection effect analyzed in Proposition
1 will be weaker for married women than for single ones. In that case, the industry-1 wage
will fall more for married women than for single women in industry 1.
We now investigate whether or not this theory is consistent with the data.
3.2.2 Empirical Test
A key point to note is that in our simple model, no matter how strong the asymmetry in
bargaining power within a marriage, the effect of tariff changes on wages of married men
and women should be symmetric. Because the criterion (3.6) for moving is simply the sum
of the two spouses’ payoffs, the selection effect will be exactly the same for husbands as for
wives. Thus, the theory can rationalize a larger wage effect of the tariff reduction for married
industry-1 workers than for unmarried workers, but it cannot rationalize a larger effect for
married women than for married men. We should also note that in this special case, the
bargaining parameter µ has no effect on worker mobility or on wages at all. It affects the
within-household allocation of consumption, but it does not affect decisions on switching
industries or moving from one town to another.
However, as seen in Tables 3 and 5 the wage responses of married men and women to
the NAFTA shock are not symmetric. This asymmetry is not restricted to wages only but
is extended to the migration behavior of married men and women as well, as reported in
Table 6. We run a set of regressions for each worker group where the dependent variable is
the change in the log labor force of educational class k, either employed or unemployed, in
conspuma c between 1990 and 2000. We regress this on the initial local tariff and change in
22
local tariff to see if movements in workers of various groups are driven to a significant degree
by the NAFTA shock.
Focusing on high school dropouts, the main message is that a conspuma with a high
level of protection that lost it by 2000 tended to lose more high school dropout women than
men over the 1990s relative to other conspumas. In particular, for married women with an
employed spouse, this loss amounted to −27.91 + 17.96 = −9.95 percent, significant at the
1 percent level, as opposed to married men with an employed spouse for which the loss was
−8.27 percent. For single high school dropout women, this loss amounts to −8.97, whereas
the share of similar single men increased by 1.1 percent, although not significantly different
from zero.11
3.3 Household Bargaining with Non-linear Preferences
3.3.1 Theory
The previous section showed that household bargaining with asymmetric bargaining power
is not sufficient to match the findings in the data, because in the model with linear util-
ity asymmetric bargaining power does not lead to asymmetric industry-switching behavior.
However, this changes if we allow for non-linear preferences.
For a simple example, let v(c, ) = c. In this specification, a member of the household
will enjoy consumption spending more while located in a town that he or she enjoys.
To see how bargaining-power asymmetry can create asymmetries in mobility in this
model, it is helpful to consider the limiting case in which the husband has all of the bargain-
ing power (that is, the limit as µ → 0). In this case, the outcome will keep the wife at her
threat-point utility, which is v(ww,iw,j, w,j) = ww,iw,jw,j. If the outcome of the bargaining
11These effects are to some extent the result of high school dropout married women leaving the labor
force which we explore later in Section 3.4. Repeating the regression with the log change in working-age
population for each educational class and group of workers instead of the labor force provides similar effects
with smaller magnitudes (Appendix Table A.5). However, the difference between initial tariff and change
in tariff is now -7.15 and -4.98 for married high school dropout men and women with an employed spouse,
respectively, also significant at the 1 percent level.
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Table 6: Labor Force Growth Regressions
Dependent variable: Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
4 in log labor force Male Female Male Female Male Female
Less than high school
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 -9.349 -27.91** -44.52*** -56.94*** -29.37*** -27.73**
(9.207) (11.21) (15.06) (19.15) (10.27) (13.82)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c -1.083 -17.96 -46.30*** -54.56*** -30.47*** -18.76
(10.01) (12.24) (16.01) (20.86) (11.16) (14.77)
F-statistic 23.96*** 25.63*** 0.48 0.57 0.34 19.35***
High school graduates
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 8.252 18.22*** -12.43 8.707 17.66* 4.804
(6.018) (6.141) (10.58) (13.57) (9.227) (6.378)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 8.241 19.41*** -21.13* 6.323 16.85* 5.231
(6.461) (6.625) (11.33) (14.39) (9.988) (6.907)
F-statistic 0.00 1.26 27.17*** 1.00 0.31 0.15
Some college
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 20.06*** 27.38*** -0.995 15.53 14.97 33.73***
(7.109) (7.248) (11.94) (14.45) (9.814) (8.657)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 20.78*** 26.35*** -6.763 8.686 12.19 33.37***
(7.630) (7.710) (13.01) (15.38) (10.44) (9.140)
F-statistic 0.39 0.80 8.90*** 8.62*** 4.06** 0.07
College graduates
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 7.890 5.366 -22.68* 3.121 12.26 -12.90
(10.03) (10.09) (11.88) (22.56) (8.168) (12.22)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 6.266 4.047 -26.92** 2.522 10.72 -14.56
(10.61) (10.99) (12.70) (24.80) (9.127) (13.09)
F-statistic 1.41 0.62 5.97** 0.02 0.88 0.88
NOTE: N=543 conspumas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The table also reports F-statistics for testing whether the difference
between initial local tariff and change in local tariff is different from zero.
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leads the couple to settle in town j′, this level of utility will require the wife’s consumption
to be
(
w,j
w,j′
)
ww,iw,j. Subtracting this from the total wages available, wh,i′h,j′ + ww,i′w,j′ gives
the amount of consumption left over for the husband, and so the utility the husband obtains
is: (
[wh,i′h,j′ + ww,i′w,j′ ]−
(
ww,iw,jw,j
w,j′
))
h,j
′
. (3.7)
Bargaining, then, results in the locational outcome that maximizes (3.7).
Clearly the husband’s and wife’s wages do not enter symmetrically, as was the case in the
linear model above. The wife’s initial-industry wage ww,iw,j has a unique role in determining
the strength of the wife’s threat point. For a couple in which the wife is initially in industry
1, a reduction in the tariff lowers ww,iw,j; aside from the direct effect that the changes in real
wages have for the two spouses in the different work options, this effect indirectly increases
the payoff to the husband in all options, because it lowers the amount of consumption he
has to give up to the wife. However, the effect is the largest for choices in a town j′, which
the husband likes more than the wife (that is, has a high value of h,j
′
w,j′ ). As a result, the way
the bargaining power works, a tariff reduction is more likely to result in a selection of town
that the husband enjoys, relative to the status quo with no tariff reduction. Importantly,
there is no corresponding role for the husband’s initial-industry wage, wh,i,j, in the allocation
decision.
Of course, in the limit as µ approaches 0, the roles will reverse, and there will be hus-
bands trapped by wives’ town preferences. The point is that with non-linear preferences,
town-dependent opportunities, and asymmetric bargaining power from treating µ as a free
parameter, we can rationalize both different switching behavior between married and unmar-
ried workers in response to a common trade shock and different moving behavior for married
male and female workers in response to a common trade shock. Further, this can rationalize
different wage responses for married women, since different switching behavior implies dif-
ferent degrees of strength for the selection effect that was formalized in Proposition 1. Now
we turn to the question of whether this richer story fits the data.
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3.3.2 Empirical Test
To test this theory, we run a set of regressions where the dependent variable is the share
of employed married (or single) women (or men) of educational class k in each industry j
and conspuma c in total labor force or working age population of conspuma c between 1990
and 2000. Our regressors include industry- and location-specific initial tariffs and change in
tariffs. According to this version of the household-bargaining theory, the employed married
women’s share in each industry/conspuma should rise when hit by a trade shock since other
groups are leaving the industry/conspuma but at least a fraction of the married women
cannot leave. However, as reported in Table 7, we find exactly the opposite.
Focusing on high school dropouts, a conspuma with a high level of protection that lost it
by 2000 tended to lose both more married women and men employed in an average industry
than single workers over the 1990s relative to other conspumas. In particular, for married
women this loss amounted to −0.611 + 0.382 = −0.229 percentage points, and for married
men −0.25 percentage points. For single high school dropout women and men, this loss
amounted to −0.111 and −0.006 percentage points, respectively.
We conclude that household bargaining with asymmetric bargaining power and non-linear
preferences cannot explain our findings any more than the linear model could.
3.4 Selective Non-participation
3.4.1 Theory
Some studies, such as Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) and Sauré and Zoabi (2014), have
found evidence of workers withdrawing from the labor force in response to a loss of tariff
protection. We argue here that under some conditions selection decisions by some women
to withdraw from the labor market in response to a trade shock hitting their industry could
produce magnified wage responses for married women compared to other workers. The way
this could happen is as follows.
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Suppose that single workers have no option to stay out of the labor market, and suppose
that cultural norms prevent a married man from doing so except in the case of disability or
retirement age (this will of course depend on the time and place and local culture, but is
probably a reasonable assumption to impose for our data period). Under these assumptions,
the only group of workers with an option to leave the labor market is married women.
Suppose that a married woman will choose to remain in the labor market if her wage is
high enough or her husband’s wage is low enough; then if an import-competing industry is
hit with a trade shock that lowers wages for all workers in the industry, a certain fraction
of the married women will respond by leaving the labor market. Now, if those women are
the most productive women in that industry, their departure will lead to a selection effect
that will magnify the effect on average wages of married women still in the industry. This
is exactly what will happen if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the departing women have
higher-income spouses - as they will tend to do because only a worker with a sufficiently
highly paid spouse can afford to leave the labor market, and (2) partners in marriage with
highly paid spouses tend to be highly paid themselves, since the marriage market features
positive assortative matching. These two features together tend to lead to the departing
women being higher-wage workers than the ones they leave behind, pushing average wages
down beyond the effect of the initial trade shock.
We can formalize a simple model as follows. Suppose that unmarried workers simply
consume their own wages but married workers share their earnings. Suppose that all married
couples have the same utility function, an increasing, concave, twice-differentiable function
U(·), which is a function of the couple’s combined real wage. If a married couple has a wife
whose real wage is ww and the husband’s real wage is wh, and if they both work, their utility
is U(ww+wh). On the other hand, if the wife chooses not to work, their utility is U(wh)+F ,
where F > 0 is extra utility they share from the wife’s extra time for non-market activities,
a parameter that is the same for all households. If U(ww + wh) − U(wh) ≥ F , the wife
will work, and otherwise she will leave the labor market. (For all workers, for the moment
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assume that there is no other alternative employment; there is only one choice, and that is
to be in or out of the labor force for married women.)
Clearly, for a given wh, a married female worker will remain in the labor market if and
only if ww is above a given threshold. Denoting that threshold as w˜w(wh), and taking the
derivative of U(w˜w(wh) + wh)− U(wh) = F with respect to wh, we obtain:
dw˜w
dwh
= U
′(wh)− U ′(w˜w(wh) + wh)
U ′(w˜w(wh) + wh) > 0. (3.8)
Therefore, we can draw a figure with ww on the horizontal axis and wh on the vertical
axis, with an upward-sloping curve representing the threshold between the region in which
the female worker stays in and leaves the labor force. This curve is represented in Figure
3.1, which measures the wife’s real wage on the horizontal axis and the husband’s on the
vertical axis. Any point in the figure to the right of the curve represents a couple wherein
the wife’s wage is high enough and the husband’s wage is low enough that the wife remains
in the labor market. Any point to the left of the curve represents a couple wherein the wife
will leave the labor market. An assumption on the curvature of U allows us to characterize
the shape of the curve:
Proposition 3. If the coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with U is everywhere
greater than 1, then the curve defined by U(w˜w(wh) + wh) − U(wh) = F goes through the
origin. Further, any ray through the origin that intersects the curve will intersect it from
below, and only once.
To fill in the rest of the model, suppose that there are many industries, one of which
is the import-competing industry 1, initially protected by a tariff. The price of industry-1
output is denoted p. We wish to compare outcomes before and after a trade shock. To make
the analysis as simple as possible, consider a two-period model, and suppose that in period 1
workers select their industries, and a fraction λ of male and female workers choose a spouse
and marry, expecting the same trade policy to prevail in period 2. In period 2, all agents
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Figure 3.1: Selective Non-participation
are surprised by a change in trade policy that lowers the value of p. Workers are unable to
change their choice of industry or spouse in period 2. Denote the initial-equilibrium value
for the industry-i output price by pi and the period-2 value by p˜i.
Each worker z has ability level az,i in industry i, which is a constant for each worker. The
distribution of az,i values is the same for male and female, married and unmarried workers.
The wage received by worker z in industry i is wz = az,ipi, so each worker z will have a wage
given by wz = maxi{az,ipi}.
Now, suppose that a randomly selected fraction λ of male and female workers marry in
period 1, sorting according to positive assortative matching. Given the symmetry of the
model, this implies that within each marriage the male wage and the female wage are equal.
As a result, every married couple will occupy a point along the 45o line, portrayed as the
solid ray, in Figure 3.2. Some fraction will have the husband and the wife both in industry
1, some will have husband in 1 and wife in 2, and so on; some fraction will be located above
the curve so that the wife leaves the labor market. The range of wages for this subset of
married female workers in industry 1 is given by ac.
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Figure 3.2: Change in Female Labor Force Participation when Spouses Work in Different
Industries
Now, consider a married couple with the wife in industry 1 and the husband in some
other industry. When the period 2 shock arrives, since p1 will fall to p˜1, the ray showing
the wage pairs for this subset of married couples will rotate as shown in the broken ray in
Figure 3.2. Consequently, a fraction of the women in this set will leave the labor market,
and only ab will remain. Since the portion of workers who remain in industry 1 will see a
wage reduction of p1−p˜1
p1 , and the portion who leave the labor market, bc, are at the higher
end of the wage distribution, the average wage for married women in this industry will fall
by more than p1−p˜1
p1 .
On the other hand, a couple with both members in industry 1 will see both wages fall
proportionally, a move down and to the left along the solid ray in Figure 3.2. If both spouses
were initially in the labor market, they will continue to be so after the shock. Consequently,
average wages for married women in this category will fall by p1−p˜1
p1 , the same as unmarried
workers or married male workers.
This can all be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 4. Assume that the coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with U is
everywhere greater than 1. Then, as a result of the trade shock, the wages of all workers in
industry 1 fall in the same proportion, except for married women whose husbands are in a
different industry. Their average wage in industry 1 falls by more than the other groups, and
their share of employment in industry 1 falls.
3.4.2 Empirical Test
To investigate the possibility that married women choose not to participate in the labor force
in response to a trade shock, we consider two additional tests. The first is to estimate a linear
probability model of labor force participation where the dependent variable is a dummy that
takes a value of 1 if the individual is in the labor force and zero otherwise. The second test
examines a subsample of married men and women where both spouses are employed in the
same or different industries. According to our theory, for those couples who work in the
same industry there would be no effect on labor force participation, and the effect of the
trade shock on wife’s and husband’s wages would be the same, because if the husband is hit
with the same wage shock as the wife, the couple cannot afford to lose her income.
Table 9 reports the results from a linear probability model of labor force participation
for each of six groups of workers. The right-hand-side variables are the same as in the wage
regression, and the results are arranged in the same way as in Table 3. The coefficients for
location effects are negative for all groups of workers at almost all educational levels, with
the effects being larger for both married and single women and decreasing in the level of
educational attainment. This implies that, for example, high school dropout female workers
in a location that had high protection and lost it by 2000 are less likely to be in the labor
force by 2000. The industry effects are less strong and imprecisely measured, but the overall
story is the same in that women are more likely to drop out of labor force than men in
highly protected industries that lost their protection by 2000. The overall message of Table
9 is that NAFTA-driven tariff reductions did disproportionately push female workers, both
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Table 9: Labor Force Participation: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.389** -1.998*** -0.41 -1.09 -0.158 -2.024***
High school graduate -0.278*** -1.291*** -1.33*** -2.397*** -0.84*** -1.583***
Some college -0.391*** -1.175*** -0.778*** -1.743*** -0.554*** -1.171***
College graduate -0.174 -0.533*** -0.561*** -1.08** -0.463** -0.763***
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.209 -0.8487* 0.113 -0.326 -0.081 -0.347
High school graduate -0.271** -0.4711 -0.347 -0.3418 -0.107 -0.244
Some college -0.205** -0.524 -0.655*** -0.563 0.025 0.255
College graduate -0.152 0.007 0.049 0.103 -0.353*** -0.309
No of observations 2,800,323 3,178,574 1,439,309 534,960 1,925,952 2,076,050
married and single, out of the labor force in the hardest-hit communities.
Next, we limit our sample to married individuals with both spouses being employed and
run separate wage and labor force participation regressions for spouses employed in the same
and different industries. Although the sample size for the former type of couples (employed
in the same industry) is small and the estimates are imprecisely measured, we do find support
for our theory (Table 10). In particular, there is no distinguishable difference in the labor
force participation response of men and women when both spouses are employed in the same
industry, and the earlier differential results across men and women are completely driven
by women who are employed in a different industry than their spouse. Similarly, there is
a substantial difference in wage responses for high school dropout men and women, albeit
imprecisely measured when spouses work in different industries with women experiencing
much slower wage growth, but this pattern is reversed for spouses working in the same
industry.
The main elements of the selective non-participation story are therefore consistent with
the data. However, we should note that this theory does not provide a full explanation.
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Table 10: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects
Wage growth Labor force participation
Same industry Different industries Same industry Different industries
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school 2.827** -1.876 -0.8 -3.91*** 0.408 0.483 -0.508*** -2.171***
High school graduate -0.601 1.146 -0.268 -0.454 0.029 -0.208 -0.321*** -1.194***
Some college 1.802 -1.022 -1.586*** -1.518** -0.17 -0.956*** -0.44*** -0.975***
College graduate 1.177 -1.192 -0.533 -2.193* -0.252** 0.14 -0.172* -0.539***
Industry effect
Less than high school 0.207 -4.326* -1.028* -3.503** 0.08 -0.526 -0.325** -1.304**
High school graduate -1.357** -3.28** -0.315 -2.689*** -0.631*** -0.222 -0.242* -0.994**
Some college -0.268 -1.263 -0.001 -1.502 -0.13 -0.169 -0.205** -1.177**
College graduate 1.132 1.12 -0.253 2.17 0.415* -0.092 -0.165 -0.251
No of observations 279,714 294,311 2,204,347 2,348,297 326,036 360,951 2,474,287 2,817,623
Table 10 shows that even for couples with both spouses employed in the same industry,
the effect of industry tariff reductions on the wife’s wage (−4.326) is negative, statistically
significant, and much larger than the statistically insignificant effect on the husband’s wage
(0.207). This would not be the case if our selective non-participation story was the sole force
driving the results.
4 Conclusion
We have documented a sharp difference in labor market response to NAFTA across gender
and marital status: The largest effects of NAFTA, by far, are shown in the wages of married
female workers whose industry of employment lost its tariff. We have shown that this cannot
be explained by the different occupation mix of male and female workers, or by household
bargaining in which husbands with disproportionate bargaining power within the household
prevent their wives from adjusting to shocks as they otherwise would wish to do. We do
find some support for an interpretation based on selective non-participation, in which some
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married female workers adjust to a trade shock by leaving the labor market; under this
interpretation, because of positive assortative matching in the marriage market, the ones
who do so tend to be the women with higher wages. However, this does not account for all
of the features of the data, so we are left with a puzzle.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. For a given worker z, fix z,j, j = 1, 2, and az,i,j for i 6= 1. The optimal choice will be
industry 1 in town 1 if and only if p1az,1,1 + z,1 ≥ max{p1az,1,2 + z,2, p2az,2,1 + z,1, p2az,2,2 +
z,2}. Consider the case in which p2az,2,1 + z,1 ≥ p2az,2,2 + z,2. Then the condition for
choosing (1, 1) reduces to:
az,1,1 ≥ az,1,2 + 
z,2 − z,1
p1
and (4.1)
az,1,1 ≥ p2
p1
az,2,1. (4.2)
The condition for choosing (1, 2) analogously becomes:
az,1,1 ≤ az,1,2 + 
z,2 − z,1
p1
and (4.3)
az,1,2 ≥ p2
p1
az,2,1. (4.4)
The condition for choosing industry 1 is then the condition that (4.1) and (4.2) or (4.3) and
(4.4) hold. This reduces to (4.2) or (4.4). These together create a region of the form of
Figure A.1. The integral of the density for az,1,1 and az,1,2 above that boundary gives the
fraction of single workers who choose industry 1, conditional on those values of z,j, j = 1, 2,
and az,i,j for i 6= 1.
Now, note that a reduction in the tariff, by reducing p1 and increasing p2, shifts the
boundary up and to the right, reducing the fraction of these workers who choose industry
1. For these workers as well, since the bottom boundary of the region is being trimmed
away, the average productivities for workers who remain above the boundary has risen. All
of this was conditional on the case p2az,2,1 + z,1 ≥ p2az,2,2 + z,2, but a parallel argument
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Figure A.1
constructed for the contrary case produces the same conclusions. Therefore, conditional on
z,j, j = 1, 2, and az,i,j for i 6= 1, a reduction in the tariff reduces the fraction of single
workers who choose industry 1, and increases the average productivity of those who remain
in industry 1. Integrating all values of z,j, j = 1, 2, and az,i,j for i 6= 1 then establishes the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. For values of ww and wh along a ray through the origin, U(ww +wh)−U(wh) can be
written as U(y) − U(κy), with κ ∈ (0, 1) a constant. For the proposition, it is sufficient to
show that this function is a decreasing function of y. First:
d
dy
[U(y)− U(κy)] = U ′(y)− κU ′(κy). (4.5)
This derivative is negative if and only if U ′(y) < κU ′(κy). For this, it is sufficient that
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κU ′(κy) be a decreasing function of κ (since κ < 1). Note:
d
dκ
[κU ′(κy)] = U ′(κy) + U ′′(κy)κy. (4.6)
This is negative if and only if
U ′′(κy)κy
U ′(κy) < −1, (4.7)
which is the stated condition.
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Table A.1: Income Growth (includes positive business and farm income for zero-wage
earners): Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.4 -3.61*** -1.42 -1.84 -1.149 -1.82
High school graduate -0.224 -0.472 -1.752** -1.51* -0.372 -0.97
Some college -1.152* -1.33* -1.122** -1.71* -0.831* -0.8138
College graduate -0.018 -2.252* -1.362 -2.038 -0.161 -0.291
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.97 -3.93*** -1.033** -4.139** -1.903*** -2.031*
High school graduate -0.43** -3.164*** 0.736** -3.05*** -0.639 -0.51
Some college 0.091 -1.662 -0.127 -2.34** 0.229 0.41
College graduate -0.243 2.83** 0.411 1.698 -0.8 0.856
No of observations 2,695,858 2,801,866 1,335,379 431,088 1,769,819 1,877,418
Table A.2: Weekly Wage Growth: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school 0.758 -0.6 0.02 -0.982 1.263* -0.39
High school graduate 0.4251 1.058* -0.935* 0.783 0.876* 0.65
Some college -0.249 0.068 -1.364** -0.895 -0.38 -0.217
College graduate 0.083 -0.83 -0.235 -1.223 0.407 0.19
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.137 -2.334*** -0.216 -3.11*** -0.769 -1.282*
High school graduate -0.148 -1.903*** 0.556 -1.988** 0.125 0.281
Some college 0.213 -0.405 0.073 -0.533 0.648* 0.951**
College graduate 0.279 2.94*** 1.071* 1.8898 0.421 1.226**
No of observations 2,484,061 2,642,608 1,225,713 410,167 1,656,555 1,809,235
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Table A.3: Wage Growth: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects (excluding
individuals over 55)
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.49 -3.82*** -3.26** -4.19 -1.794** -2.31
High school graduate -0.215 -0.592 -1.78*** -2.39** -0.137 -0.57
Some college -0.994* -1.371* -1.157* -1.704 -0.817* -0.465
College graduate -0.293 -1.749 -0.2 -3.117*** 0.079 -0.449
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.91* -3.922** -1.093** -3.818** -2.048*** -2.803***
High school graduate -0.53* -2.975*** 0.251 -3.475** -0.783 -0.418
Some college -0.1488 -1.603* -0.047 -0.998 -0.058 0.873
College graduate 0.243 2.046 0.431 2.433 -0.53 0.335
No of observations 2,197,807 2,440,960 991,668 281,180 1,543,163 1,598,206
Table A.4: Wage Growth: Difference between Initial Tariff and Impact Effects (limiting to
workers with spouses between ages 25 and 64)
Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse
Male Female Male Female
Location effect
Less than high school -0.19 -3.87*** -1.94 -3.52*
High school graduate -0.374 -0.473 -2.077*** -1.16
Some college -1.22* -1.35 -1.054* -1.235
College graduate -0.212 -1.941* -0.938 -1.63
Industry effect
Less than high school -0.796 -3.8057** -0.66 -3.673**
High school graduate -0.471** -2.948*** 0.76** -3.752***
Some college -0.007 -1.541* -0.199 -1.268
College graduate -0.104 2.05 0.617 -1.409
No of observations 2,402,200 2,580,460 1,153,077 334,415
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Table A.5: Working Age Population Growth Regressions
Dependent variable: Employed spouse Unemployed/NILF spouse Single
4 in log working age
population
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Less than high school
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 -11.47 -27.32*** -63.35*** -72.40*** -36.27*** -38.46***
(8.451) (8.821) (14.59) (19.05) (9.993) (12.81)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c -4.324 -22.34** -66.43*** -68.74*** -38.33*** -32.09**
(9.175) (9.703) (15.74) (20.35) (10.72) (13.86)
F-statistic 21.60*** 8.60*** 1.33 1.74 1.50 10.97***
High school graduates
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 9.115 14.91** -19.05* 3.390 18.07** 4.902
(5.632) (5.819) (10.35) (11.15) (8.493) (6.482)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 9.064 14.55** -28.51** -2.153 16.45* 3.571
(6.088) (6.268) (11.15) (11.87) (9.200) (6.945)
F-statistic 0.00 0.13 31.60*** 8.01*** 1.42 1.76
Some college
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 18.06*** 26.59*** -1.714 12.50 15.19* 34.90***
(6.915) (7.295) (10.61) (12.03) (8.203) (7.654)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 18.44** 24.90*** -7.675 3.552 12.08 33.17***
(7.438) (7.800) (11.60) (12.91) (8.815) (8.138)
F-statistic 0.11 2.12 11.47*** 21.14*** 5.87** 1.98
College graduates
Initial tariff, locτ c1990 6.638 4.509 -17.88 13.79 11.99 -12.78
(9.795) (9.310) (12.29) (21.17) (8.162) (12.72)
Change in tariff, loc4τ c 4.808 2.466 -22.37* 12.45 10.50 -14.99
(10.26) (10.20) (13.07) (22.55) (9.051) (13.61)
F-statistic 2.02 1.59 6.99*** 0.19 0.91 1.64
NOTE: N=543 conspumas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The table also reports F-statistics for testing whether the difference
between initial local tariff and change in local tariff is different from zero.
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